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Summary
One of the major trends in the world economy in the past two decades was the as-
cent of China. The fast-growing Chinese economy is already the second largest in the 
world with an outlook to take the first place from the United States within ten years. 
Moreover, China is already the world’s largest trading nation. At 3225 billion dollars, 
its volume of trade surpassed the trade volume of the United States in 2010 (Scott–
Sam, 2016). With its economy growing, China is also becoming more ambitious. U. 
S. – China trade approaching 600 billion dollars in 2015, China’s economic ties with 
the United States are already strong. Within the framework of its new land and mari-
time silk road initiative, China is now reaching out to Europe. As one of the largest 
economies and markets, and new global companies like Huawei and Alibaba, China 
is an important trade and economic partner. On the other hand, it is also a potent 
competitor for markets and resources. Is the ascendance and expansion of China an 
opportunity or threat? Does China naturally look for partners for mutual benefits 
and development or does it seek to control the world? Probably both. We attempt to 
help the reader answer these questions for themselves by looking at various aspects of 
Chinese expansion towards Europe including investment, trade, Chinese companies 
in Europe, and some characteristics of Chinese economy and society that may guide 
its path of future development. 
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Trade
China is the largest trading nation in the world and an important trade partner of the 
European Union. In 2015, China was the top partner of EU for imports, and after the 
United States, the second largest partner for exports. Roughly a fifth of all EU imports 
came from China and almost a tenth of all EU exports was to China. According to a news 
release on the EU-China summit last July in Beijing, EU deficit in trade in goods with 
China reached a record high of 180 billion euros in 2015, while trade in services reached 
a record surplus of 10.3 billion euros the same yea (Eurostat, 2016a). Trade with China 
has been growing dynamically in the past decade as shown on Figure 1 and Figure 2.
Figure 1: Development of EU exports and imports of goods with China, 2005–2015
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Within the EU, Germany is undeniably the largest trade partner of China with 
exports of goods reaching 71  973  million euros and import of goods reaching 
69 036 million euros in 2015. Exports and imports of other EU countries are displayed 
on Figure 3 below.
The share of Chine from the total exports and imports of goods of EU Member 
States is shown on Figure 4. For all EU Member States except Finland China has a 
larger share of the country’s imports than of its exports. However, for some countries, 
namely Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Sweden, and Denmark, China is also 
a major export destination. On the other end of the spectrum, China has a large share 
of the total imports of the Netherlands and Luxemburg but not of their exports.
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Figure 2: Development of EU exports and imports of services with China, 2005–2015
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Figure 3: Exports and imports of EU Member States in goods with China, 2015
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Figure 4: Share of Chine from total exports and imports of EU Member States in goods, 2015
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The Hungarian Central Statistical Office reports different numbers for the im-
ports of goods to Hungary in 2015. According to the Hungarian Central Statistical 
Office, Hungary imported 7901.8 million euros of goods from China in 2015, 9.65 per 
cent of a total imports of 81 864.9 million euros. China is the largest source of Hun-
garian imports outside the EU, followed by Russia (4.35 per cent) and the United 
States (2.70 per cent). However, Chinese imports still dwarf beside the import from 
Germany, which is 22.50 per cent of the country’s total imports (KSH, 2016).
China is the largest single source of imports for the European Union but may not 
be the most important source. At 23.9 per cent, the share of European countries that 
are not EU members exceeds the 20.3 per cent share of China. Other major import 
partners are the United States with a share of 14.4 per cent, and Russia with a share 
of 7.9 per cent. European countries outside the EU also take the largest share of EU 
exports at 22.9 per cent. The second largest share, 20.7 per cent, goes to the United 
States and China is only the third largest EU export destination with a share of 9.5 per 
cent (Eurostat, 2016b).
Regarding the composition of Chinese exports and imports in goods, manufac-
tured goods, mainly machinery and vehicles dominate both the exports and the im-
ports (Eurostat, 2016a).
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OBOR
With a growing economy and deepening trade relations, China recognized it is time 
for more. In 2013, President Xi Jingpin of China announced the One Belt One Road 
initiatives, a strategy for open and advance the country’s neighborhood diplomacy. 
The initiative aim at the joint development of huge economic zones on the Eurasian 
continent and reaching out to Africa with the leadership of China. One Belt stands for 
the economic belt along the ancient silk road, a network of trade routes connecting 
major civilizations across Asia, Europe, and Africa. One Road refers to the 21st century 
concept of a maritime silk road connecting countries of the Malay Archipelago, and 
countries along the shores of the South China Sea, and the Indian Ocean (Yi, 2015).
China says its initiative is open to all nations (Yi, 2015) and indeed there is no 
country list in its official news release about the initiative (NDRC, 2015). A group of 
64 countries, including China, however, is frequently mentioned. Figure 5 displays a 
map of the countries involved and approximate conceptual paths of the Belt and the 
Road based on analyses of think tanks actively researching the OBOR initiative.
Figure 5: The Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road
Source: Map based on Jinchen, 2016, country shading based on HKTDC, 2017 and Chin et al., 2015
A usual measure to highlight the importance of the OBOR initiative is the share 
of the OBOR area of the total world land area, population, and the like. According 
to Fung Business Intelligence Centre, a Hong Kong based think tank, OBOR coun-
tries represent 38.9 per cent of the total world land area, 64.2 per cent of total world 
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population, 37.3 per cent of world GDP, and 31.4 per cent of total world household 
consumption (Chin et al., 2015). Their calculations are based on a list of 58 countries, 
including China, Greece, Italy, Germany, and the Netherlands but excluding most 
Central European countries with Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, and the Czech Repub-
lic among them (Chin et al., 2015, Appendix I.).
The OBOR initiative is a framework for international economic cooperation. Chi-
na claims that the initiative upholds the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence: mu-
tual respect for each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggres-
sion, mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual 
benefit, and peaceful coexistence. In other words, China wants to exclude nudging 
for democratization or discussion of sensitive issues from the negotiations of develop-
ment programmes.
The OBOR initiative is organized around five priorities. First priority is policy 
coordination which covers multi-level communication and harmonization of macro-
economic policies as well as political support of large-scale projects along the Belt 
and Road. Second is facilities connectivity which means better integration of infra-
structure of the OBOR countries. The third principle is unimpeded trade or in other 
words, promoting free trade according to liberal principles. The fourth principle is 
financial integration. This includes deepening of financial cooperation, building a 
currency stability system, investment and financing system, and credit information 
system in Asia. Establishing the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank also belongs to 
this principle. Finally, developing a people-to-people bond along the Belt and Road 
is the fifth priority. This priority includes cooperation in the fields of education, tour-
ism, healthcare, science and technology, employment and entrepreneurship, social 
security, and public administration, and also the communication between political 
parties and organizations of the countries along the Belt and Road (NDRC, 2015).
The OBOR initiative has its strengths but there are also challenges from domestic 
constraints to regional tensions to great power rivalries. China’s impressive econom-
ic growth has also brought about large regional inequalities with wealth and devel-
opment concentrated on the South Eastern coastal provinces of the country (Pop, 
2016:4). This itself poses a challenge as infrastructure connecting the bulk of China’s 
economy to the Silk Road Economic Belt area has to cross thousands of kilometers 
through underdeveloped Chinese provinces first. Additionally, the initiative is based 
on voluntary cooperation between partners but there are tensions in the neighbor-
hood almost everywhere on China’s perimeter as illustrated on Figure 6 (Pop, 2016:8). 
Although these are not necessarily high intensity conflicts, problems may make agree-
ments on project scopes and plans more difficult.
What is in OBOR for Hungary and Hungarian companies? It mainly depends on 
our own approach to participating in the initiative. “The time has come for elevating 
cooperation between Central-Europe and China to a higher level, the level of strate-
gic partnership, and this could take place next year” said Prime Minister Viktor Orbán 
in October 2016 at the conference titled Dialogue Between China and the Central-
Eastern-European Political Parties (MTI, 2016d). While a comprehensive strategy to 
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Figure 6: Tensions and challenges around China’s perimeter
Source: Map edited by the author based on Rowntree et al., 2005
utilize the OBOR initiative to Hungary’s advantage is yet to be drafted, Tekes, the 
Finnish government agency for funding innovation, published a short report about 
the opportunities in participating in OBOR for Finland and Finnish companies (En-
right, Scott and Associates, 2016). The report, compiled by Enright, Scott and Asso-
ciates, a Hong Kong based strategy consultancy firm, says that Finland and Finnish 
companies have opportunities in OBOR in the fields of development, operation, and 
maintenance of infrastructure; financial and professional services; transportation and 
logistics; information and communication systems; commerce, manufacture, and sup-
ply chains; and energy, natural resources, and agriculture. In order to benefit from 
these opportunities, Finland and the Finnish companies should proactively seek and 
develop projects that can be put under the OBOR rubric, based on their own special 
strengths and advantages (Enright, Scott and Associates, 2016). Hungary should follow 
a similar strategy building on its own strengths and active participation.
China reaches out to Europe
The Silk Road Economic Belt stretches through Eurasia but its fundamental goal is 
obviously to reach Europe. With 18 per cent of China’s total export, the United States 
is the largest export market of the country and also the second largest source of im-
ports at 8.95 per cent of total imports. Exports to Germany, the largest trading partner 
of China in Europe, were only 3.03 per cent of total exports (The World Bank, 2016.) 
On the other hand, the 28 countries of the European Union combined constitute 
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the largest economy in the world and the largest consumer market (Bryan, 2015). 
Accordingly, the European Union combined has already been China’s biggest trading 
partner for more than a decade (Hansakul–Levinger, 2014).
Investment relations are also developing. The European Union is among China’s 
top FDI sources European investments accounting for around 18 per cent of China’s 
FDI stock in 2012. However, this is only 2 per cent of the total FDI stock hold by the 
European Union. Although Chinese investment in Europe started to rise sharply in 
2010, China’s FDI in the EU is still tiny and Chinese investment has often been la-
belled as strategic in the sense that it allows Chinese companies access to European 
technology in return for financing (Hansakul–Levinger, 2014). 
The dynamics of the development of economic relations is also impressive. Ac-
cording to a 2015 report of BusinessEurope, a Brussels based advocate of European 
enterprises, changes in trade and investment between 2009 and 2013 were as follows 
(BusinessEurope, 2015:3):
– EU exports in goods to China grew by 80 per cent to 148.3 billion euros in 2013;
– EU imports in goods from China grew by 30 per cent to 280.1 billion euros in 
2013;
– EU exports in services to China grew by 71 per cent to 32.2 billion euros in 2013;
– EU imports in services from China grew by 47 per cent to 20.6 billion euros in 2013;
– EU outward direct investment to China grew 1 per cent to 8.2 billion euros in 2013;
– China inward investment to EU grew 1100 per cent to 1.1 billion euros in 2013.
Development of economic relations between Europe and China is a good thing 
but Europe needs to think about a strategy to enjoy all the benefits without the draw-
backs and risks involved. Why should we study China’s expansion towards Europe 
more closely? Because China’s tightly controlled economic and industrial policies 
strongly affect the economic wellbeing of the European Union while its policies in 
Africa are transforming parts of a neighboring continent whose development is im-
portant to Europe. An even more important reason, however, is that treating China 
as the emerging power it used to be, rather than the global force it has become, is a 
dangerous mistake.
The present emerging China strategy of Europe is unconditional engagement 
based on the anachronistic belief that China, under the influence of European en-
gagement, will liberalize its economy, improve the rule of law and democratize its 
politics. This approach, however, ignores China’s economic and political strength and 
disregards its determination to resist foreign influence. Thus, the EU allows China to 
throw many more obstacles in the way of European companies that want to enter the 
Chinese market than Chinese companies face in the EU. Besides, China systemati-
cally exploits the division among EU Member States seeing the EU as an economic 
giant which is weak, politically divided and militarily noninfluential (Fox–Godement, 
2009:1–3).
Member of the European Union are split over two main issues about China: 1) 
how to manage its impact on the European economy and 2) how to engage China 
politically. Four distinct groups of European countries can be identified:
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– The small group of Assertive Industrialists (Czech Republic, Germany, and Po-
land) are the only EU members willing to stand up to China vigorously on both po-
litical and economic issues. Members of this group do not agree that market forces 
should shape the nature of the EU-China relationship. They are ready to pressure 
China with sector-specific demands, to support protective “anti-dumping” measures 
agains unfairly subsidized Chinese goods, or to threaten other trade sanctions.
– Another small group, the Ideological Free Traders (Denmark, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom) are mostly ready to pressure China on politics and 
mostly opposed to restricting its trade. Free trade ideology also serves the economic 
interest of these countries. Their high technology and services oriented economies 
and labor markets benefit, or perceive to benefit, from Chinese growth rather than 
being threatened by cheap Chinese imports.
– The largest group, the Accommodating Mercantilists (with Hungary among 
them), share the assumption that good political relations with China lead to commer-
cial benefit. These countries follow protectionist policies on the one hand but shun 
confrontation with China on political questions on the other. These countries have 
often kept the EU from more assertive stance on issues like Tibet or human rights and 
some of them even act like proxies for China in the EU.
– Member States belonging to the fourth group, the group of European Followers, 
rely on the EU in their policies towards China, support EU policies, but reluctant to 
participate actively in the debate, feeding the perception that China is not a key EU 
priority.
The division among Member States makes China perceive the EU as disunited. Any 
attempt to strengthen the European position must start with the acknowledgment that 
no member state is big enough to match China alone (Fox–Godement, 2009:3–7).
At first, China saw the EU as a serious political partner, even a counterbalance to 
the United States. One result of European division, however, is that China is now ap-
proaching the EU as an economic space to be used for its own development rather 
than a serious political partner. While Europeans rely on a strategy of trying to win 
over China by unconditional engagement, China uses a strategy based on the follow-
ing three sets of tactics (Fox–Godement, 2009:33–35):
– Taking advantage of the mismatch between its own centralized authority and the 
rule-based system of government of the EU. China makes full use of the openness of 
EU markets while using fuzziness of its own administrative channels to restrict access 
to its own markets.
– China channels EU pressure on sensitive issues, such as human rights, by accept-
ing formal dialogues about them and then turning them into inconclusive talking 
shops. China reassures the EU by using soothing language about the virtues of multi-
lateralism but the real goal is to deflect European efforts.
– China exploits and also fosters the division between EU members with unusual 
ruthlessness, targeting individual Member States with punitive measures when nation-
al interests are at stake or short term goals require it. One example: in the building of 
the high-speed railway between Beijing and Shanghai in the early 1990s, for example, 
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China played German interests against those of France by requesting more and more 
technology transfers from companies such as Siemens and Alstom (Le Corre, 2015).
No wonder there is a deeply ingrained disappointment within the EU with the 
direction of Chinese political reform and also a disenchantment in Europe’s com-
mercial relationship with China with the two sides having long past their honeymoon 
(Nicholson, 2015). On the other hand, the attitude of most Chinese towards the Eu-
ropean Union or its citizens is positive with trustworthiness emerging as the most 
characteristic perception (Dekker–Noll, 2012).
EU–China FDI
After three decades of trade integration and significant investment of European busi-
nesses in China, the first wave of Chinese capital has arrived in Europe. Annual out-
bound foreign direct investment by Chinese companies now exceeds 100 billion dol-
lars and has shifted from natural resources in developing countries to technology, 
Figure 7:  Geographical distribution of Chinese greenfield and acquisition FDI in the 
European Union with value of cumulative investment from 2000–2015 for each 
country in million euros
Source: Map edited by the author based on Hanemann–Huotari, 2016, Figure 5
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brands, real estate and other assets in advanced economies. Annual investment by 
Chinese companies in EU Member States also soared from virtually zero in the mid-
2000s to 14 billion euros in 2014. From 2000 to 2014 there were over 1000 greenfield 
projects and acquisitions in the European Union with a total worth of over 46 billion 
euros (Hanemann–Huotari, 2015:5). Geographical distribution of Chinese FDI is dis-
played on Figure 7 below. The figure shows data also including 2015 already.
State owned companies play an important role in China’s investment in Europe, 
but growth in recent years is mostly driven by private companies and financial inves-
tors from the most advanced eastern coastal provinces. The sectors that attracted the 
most Chinese capital are energy, automotive, food, and real estate (Hanemann–Huo-
tari, 2015:5). Composition of Chinese investment by sector is shown on Figure 8.
Figure 8: Sector composition of Chinese FDI in the European Union from 2000–2014
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Source: Data from Hanemann–Huotari, 2015, Figure 8.2
The growth of Chinese FDI in Europe is a good opportunity to attract much need-
ed capital that can also help in restarting investment and economic growth, and gen-
erating spill overs and backward linkages to the Chinese consumer market. However, 
Europe needs to take some steps to maximize benefits from Chinese investment. First, 
it needs to implement structural reforms in order to be able to successfully compete 
with other advanced economies for Chinese FDI. Second, it needs to rethink its ap-
proaches to investment promotion and investor support, including an increase of ca-
pacities on the ground in China. Third, policymakers need to be prepared to defend 
the principle of investment openness against populist and local criticisms.
There are also concerns about Chinese FDI because of the unique political and 
economic system of the country. The EU needs to act on this front as well. The first 
priority should be a robust bilateral investment agreement between the EU and China 
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that addresses the existing asymmetries in market access through pre-establishment 
rights for European companies and a short negative list for sectors restricted to for-
eign investment. Second, Europe should develop a strategy to push China on prom-
ised reforms especially in issues of state subsidies and other non-market elements dis-
torting global competition. Third, greater coordination of the security review process 
in needed to increase the efficiency and coherence of such reviews ensuring there is a 
functioning solution in place to monitor and mitigate potential security risks (Hane-
mann–Huotari, 2015:6–7).
From security perspective, China poses new challenges for host countries. In ad-
dition to economic risks, FDI can also raise national security concerns for host coun-
tries. For example, it can be an additional channel for foreign interests for infiltra-
tion, surveillance, and sabotage of critical infrastructures in energy, transport, cyber 
and financial networks. Another example is the transfer of technology or expertise 
to a foreign-controlled entity that might be deployed in a harmful way against the 
interests of a nation.
In recent decades, all major source countries of FDI in Europe were democrat-
ic market economies with the only significant exceptions of Singapore and Russia. 
Newly emerging capital exporters, like Japan, were either military allies or simply not 
large enough to matter. China, however, is different. It is the world’s second largest 
economy, and one of the top five outbound FDI exporters, but it is a country with 
an authoritarian political regime, a unique economic system, weak security relation-
ship with most major recipient countries and increasing assertiveness on the global 
stage (Hanemann–Huotari, 2015:41). It also has a completely different concept of 
war, peace, conflict, and advancing a nations interests (Handel, 1996).
In their 2016 update to their report published in 2015, experts of the Mercator 
Institute for China Studies and Rhodium Group say the trends of a growing Chinese 
investment in Europe, together with the related opportunities and concerns, con-
tinued. Additionally, slower growth and transition to a new economic model turned 
Chinese investors even more towards advanced industrial assets, modern services, and 
real estate, while Chinese investment also increasingly extended beyond the Big Three 
economies (Germany, France, and the United Kingdom), fueling an intra-European 
competition for Chinese capital (Hanemann–Huotari, 2016).
In the past decade, China also became the largest outbound FDI investor among 
emerging economies, surpassing Russia in 2011 as shown on Figure 9. Chinese com-
panies are present in 184 countries and the principal recipient region of Chinese 
investment is Asia. Europe is only the third, following Latin America and ahead of 
North America, Africa, and Oceania. Regarding the nature of ownership of Chinese 
firms with overseas investments, state owned enterprises are still predominant but 
private companies are rapidly gaining ground (Casaburi, 2016:21).
The largest non-financial Chinese transnational companies in terms of assets held 
abroad are listed in Table 1. The list is based on data from the Chinese Ministry of 
Commerce (Casaburi, 2016:21).
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Figure 9: FDI accumulated abroad between 2005 and 2014 in emerging economies
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Source: Casaburi, 2016, Chart 2
Table 1. Main non-financial Chinese transnational companies in terms of assets held abroad
1 China Petrochemical Corp.
2 China National Petroleum Corp.
3 China Resources
4 China National Offshore Oil Comp.
5 China Unicom Corp.
6 China State Construction Engineering Corp.
7 China Merchants Group
8 Sinochem Corp.
9 China Ocean Shipping
10 China National Cereals, Oils & Foodstuff
11 Aluminium Corp. of China
12 China Mobile Communications Corp.
13 Beijing Enterprises Group Comp.
14 China Minmetals Cor.
15 Guangzhou Yuexiu Holdings
16 Citic Group
17 China Communication Construction Comp.
18 China Power Investment Corp.
19 BOE Technology Group
20 Huawei Technologies
            Source: Casaburi, 2016, Table 1
229
Civic Review · Vol. 13, Special Issue, 2017
The sectors most targeted by Chinese investment in Europe are energy, real estate, 
and manufacturing. This pattern differs from China’s global investment preferences 
where business services and leasing, finance, and mining and energy are the most pre-
ferred sectors. The main differences between China’s investment strategy in Europe 
and elsewhere are (Casaburi, 2016:47):
– There is very limited Chinese activity in the mining sectors and extraction indus-
tries within Europe because of both the smaller deposit of resources and the stringent 
environmental controls imposed on extraction projects.
– There are more acquisitions of manufacturing companies by Chinese firms in 
the EU than in other regions the main objectives being the acquirement of techno-
logical capabilities and know-how.
– There are more investment projects related to scientific and technical research 
than in other regions in the world.
The key Chinese investment in Europe between 2010 and 2014 with a value of at 
least 1 billion dollars are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2. Key Chinese investments in Europe with a value of at least 1 billion dollars 2010–2014 
Year Chinese company
Amount in 
million USD
Sector Involved party Country
2013
China National 
Petroleum Corp.
4,210 energy Eni SpA Italy
2011 Three Gorges 3,510
energy and 
electricity
Energias de Portugal Portugal
2011 CIC 3,240
energy and 
electricity
GDF Suez France
2014
State Grid Cor. of 
China
2,811
energy and 
electricity
Cassa Depositi e 
Prestiti SpA
Italy
2012 Bright Foods 1,940
agriculture / 
consumer2
Weetabix
United 
Kingdom
2011
Wanhua Indus-
trial Group Co.
1,552 basic materials Borsod Chem Zrt. Hungary
2014 Hony Capital Ltd. 1,540 agriculture Gondola Group Ltd.
United 
Kingdom
2012 Sinopec3 1,500
energy and 
electricity
Talisman Energy
United 
Kingdom
2012 Huawei 1,500 telecom and IT greenfield Hungary
2012 Huawei 1,500 telecom and IT greenfield Spain
2010 Geely Auto4 1,500 manufacturing Ford Sweden
2010
China Huaneng 
Group Corp.
1,232 utilities InterGen NV
Nether-
lands
2014 COFCO 1,210 agriculture Nidera
Nether-
lands
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Year Chinese company
Amount in 
million USD
Sector Involved party Country
2012
Weichai Power 
Co. Ltd.
1,136 industrials KION Group AG Germany
2014 Dongfeng 1,100 manufacturing Peugeot France
2011
Petro China Co. 
Ltd.
1,015 energy Ineos Ltd.
United 
Kingdom
Source: Casaburi, 2016:48–55; Hansakul–Levinger, 2014:14
One more transaction from 2008 deserves to be mentioned: Aluminum Corpo-
ration of China, teamed with Alcoa Inc., acquired a minority stake in mining giant 
Rio Tinto of United Kingdom for 14.135 billon dollars (Hansakul–Levinger, 2014:14; 
Dean–Batson–Matthews, 2008).
As we can see from Table 2, Hungary is also on the map of Chinese investors with 
Huawei’s 1.5 billion dollar greenfield investment in 2012. In their 2015 study, Éltető 
and Szunomár from the Hungarian Academy of Sciences reviews East Asian invest-
ment activities in the Visegrád countries until 2012. Comparing Chinese investment 
with Japanese and South Korean FDI in the Visegrád countries, she found that Chi-
nese investment was still lagging behind investment from Japan and South Korea in 
the region as shown on Figure 10.
Figure 10: FDI stock in the Visegrád countries from China, Japan, and South Korea in 2012
–7
,1
65
,4
47
,1 21
8,
5
10
58
,1
77
2,
6
92
,9 1
09
3,
112
28
10
47
,7
18
99
,1
62
5,
8
–500
0
500
1000
1500
2000
Czech Republic Hungary Slovakia Poland
China Japan South Korea
Source: Éltető–Szunomár, 2015
The authors also report that Chinese investment in Hungary exceeded 3 billion 
dollars by 2014, representing about 2-2.5 per cent of Hungary’s total FDI stock. About 
half of that was from the investment of China’s Wanhua in Hungary’s Borsod Chem, 
the largest Chinese investment in the Central Eastern European region. Other major 
investors in Hungary were Huawei, ZTE  Corporation, Lenovo, Sevenstar Electron-
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ics Co., BYD Electronics and Comlink. Most of the Chinese transnational companies 
operate in manufacturing and Hungary is also a significant distribution center in the 
region. In addition to manufacturing, Chinese companies also invest in the chemical 
industry, telecommunications, trade, wholesale and retail commerce, banking, hotels 
and catering, logistics, real estate and consultancy. In terms of numbers, most of the 
Chinese companies operating in Hungary are small businesses in the service and re-
tail sector (Éltető–Szunomár, 2015:16).
In the spring of 2012, Hungary launched a new foreign economic policy focusing 
on diversifying foreign economic relations by strengthening and developing Eastern 
economic relations while maintaining its strong existing relations with Western indus-
trial countries. The strategy also includes investment promotion from Eastern coun-
tries with China being one of the most prominent partner among them. Despite the 
efforts, only minor amounts of new Chinese investment have arrived in the country 
since the start of the new strategy. One reason can be the difference between the ap-
proaches and interest of the two sides. Hungary prefers greenfield investments with 
cheap Chinese financing while China expressed it interest in public infrastructure in-
vestment projects and offered forms of financing not compatible with EU regulations 
(Éltető–Szunomár, 2015:21–24).
Uncertainties ahead
China’s recent investment surge highlighted by the economic slowdown created posi-
tive excitement in Europe. Indeed, Chinese capital may contribute to the revival of 
European economies but there are also uncertainties ahead. Will the trend of raising 
Chinese investments endure? Does China purely follow its business and economic 
interests or are there hidden political motives? How will China solve its own problems 
and how will those solutions affect its investments in Europe?
As Chinese banks and investment funds are state controlled, even commercial-
ly motivated investments might be leveraged to pursue political goals in the future, 
while the EU does not have a central investment review system similar to those of 
other developed countries such as the United States, Australia, or Japan. Without the 
review system, the EU lacks an important capability to prevent it from losing its indus-
trial capabilities and preserve its technological leadership (Sonzogni, 2012).
One example is both promising and illuminating about Chinese intentions and 
strategy. In the hope of countering European sanctions for its invasion of Ukraine, 
Russia tried to strengthen its alliance with China on energy, defense, and agricultural 
trade and investment. Moscow’s strategy, however, has failed as China continued to di-
versify its energy sources so that rather than playing Europe by engaging with China, 
Russia is getting played by China (Eder–Huotari, 2016). Two lessons can be derived 
from Russia’s example. First, China seems to follow its economic interest. Second, 
China was ready to use Russia’s weakness to promote its own interests. In other words, 
China looks for business opportunities but it is not responsible for our own interests, 
it is up to us to negotiate for a deal that also benefits us.
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Another source of uncertainty is that although Chinese investments in Europe are 
growing, they are still a small share of the total Chinese outbound FDI, and only a few 
acquisitions are successful either from a profit and value point of view or from a stra-
tegic perspective. The successful takeovers are results of synergies with the Chinese 
partner contributing to competitiveness in specific markets or industries instead of 
merely funding the acquired company (Sonzogni, 2012).
Regardless of its international ambitions and strategy in Europe, China also has 
its own internal problems that may add to the uncertainties. Maybe the two most 
important from the uncertainty point of view are demographic trends and the large 
income and regional inequalities accompanying its rapid economic growth. These 
two problems lead China to an economic and political watershed that the country 
may not pass without trouble.
With life expectancy growing and fertility rate plunging, many fear that China’s 
population ages faster than the country can accommodate. In 2014, people older 
than 60 reached a 15 per cent share in China’s population, a share expected to double 
by 2050 with median age rising from 35 to 46 during the same period. With a growing 
number of older people and a shrinking number of younger people, the country’s 
working age population has started to shrink, from roughly 941 million in 2011 to 
916 million in 2014. This shrinking work force may raise wage levels, making China 
lose competitiveness to countries like India, Indonesia, and Vietnam.
There are also good news, however. Employment rate has increased and productiv-
ity is expected to rise as people entering the work force are better educated than those 
exiting. China has also been improving its pension system although this may also rise 
labor cost while providing more old age security.5 Regardless whether the state or 
the family will be the primary provider of eldercare, the problem of an aging society 
remains. The offspring of today’s aging baby boomers were born under China’s one 
child policy, which means that they will need to care for two parents, and sometimes 
four grandparents, without the help of siblings (Lou, 2015).
An aging population will not only bring economic uncertainties but also challenges 
to the government of China. Demography, however, is not the only challenge. At the 
Royal Society in London in 2011 Chinese premier Wen Jiabao declared, “Tomorrow’s 
China will be a country that fully achieves democracy, the rule of law, fairness, and 
justice. Without freedom, there is no real democracy. Without guarantee of economic 
and political rights, there is no real freedom” (Huang, 2013:47). Despite the bold 
statement, however, the Chinese Communist Party has not adopted any genuine po-
litical reforms since 1989. This strategy of relying on economic growth cab work only 
when the economy is booming and China’s economy already started to slow down. 
Additionally, according to 2003 surveys, 72.3 per cent of the Chinese public believes 
that democracy is desirable, and 67 per cent believes that it is suitable to China so that 
what has held China back from democracy is not a lack of demand but a lack of supply 
(Huang, 2013).
Changes may already be under way. Some argue that with the ascension of Deng 
Xiaoping, China has started its third, and still ongoing, 20th century revolution and 
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even political reforms has “taken place quietly and out of view” (Lampton, 2014:74). 
The reason for the need for political change is the fact that it is becoming harder to 
govern for Beijing under the current framework. China’s leadership must now con-
front a population with more resources, in terms of money, talent, and information, 
than ever before. In addition, the Chinese society, economy, and bureaucracy have 
fragmented with powerful new economic interest groups, stronger and larger private 
businesses, a growing number of educated middle class, and more than half a billion 
Chinese internet users (Lampton, 2014). While the need for change is obvious now, 
the direction and pace of change is not, contributing to the uncertainty of China’s 
future economic development, including its investment strategy in Europe.
Maybe the most important factor contributing to this uncertainty is the exhaustion 
of the main driving force behind China’s fast development, the seemingly inexhaust-
ible surplus labor from China’s rural hinterland. In the past decades, rapid growth of 
China’s industry could be explained by the two-sector model in which the industry 
is facing a perfectly elastic labor supply curve until there is surplus labor in the agri-
culture. Under these circumstances, wages do not rise until the industry absorbs all 
surplus labor (Gillis et al., 1996). However, wages already do rise in China. Since 2001, 
hourly manufacturing wages in China have risen by an average of 12 per cent a year. 
Additionally, Chinese industry have been transforming from cheap manufacturing 
to technologically more advanced industries also including design (Jiaxing–Yangon, 
2015).
A more advanced industry requires more advanced skills, making the absorption 
of surplus labor from the rural hinterland more difficult. This not only means that 
China hits the wall of the exhaustion of growth based on surplus labor but also means 
that the two sector of the Chinese economy is decoupling, leading to an unbridge-
able gap between the two. As industrial development in China is concentrated on 
the coastal provinces, this also means that the country itself is divided into a dynamic 
coastal region and a lagging hinterland putting one more layer of pressure on the 
Chinese government.
What this has to do with China’s presence and investments in Europe? Trends of 
Chinese outbound investments can be affected by the country’s economic growth 
as well as its need to turn its resources to domestic consumption or developing its 
welfare system. Since Europe has only a relatively small share of China’s outbound in-
vestments, effects of these factors on the level of investment are likely to be amplified.
Crocodile in the Yangtze
When looking at Chinese development and investment, many focus on the role of 
the state and try to win the goodwill of the Chinese government to promote Chinese 
investment in their economy. They often fail to notice a new player in the Chinese 
economy that will be more important and interesting in the future: the Chines glob-
al private enterprise. Huawei, with its large greenfield investments in Hungary and 
Spain, and Geely, the Chinese company buying Volvo, are two examples. Alibaba, the 
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operator of the world’s largest global e-commerce platform for small and medium 
sized businesses is another example.
Why are these companies interesting and important? Because they are the fastest 
growing new cornerstones of the Chinese economy, and they are also global players al-
ready. Moreover, they think and act differently than Chinese state owned companies, 
and in an environment less supportive towards private businesses than that of their 
global competitors, they focus more on their customers. In his recent book, Porter Er-
isman, former vice president of Alibaba, let us peek into this new kind of companies.
Alibaba started as a modest website to make Chinese businesses visible to the world 
on the internet. Realizing the opportunities, its founder, Jack Ma, wanted to build a 
global e-commerce portal based in China but serving customers all over the world. 
Alibaba is a completely private enterprise. It has never got subsidies from the state. 
Instead, the early growth and development of the company was financed by Japanese 
and American venture capital. As the company grew, the founders realized the need 
for professional management and they hired experienced professionals like Savio 
Kwan, COO of Alibaba. Born in Hong Kong, he studied in London and worked for 
GE in China bringing both Western management expertise and local Chinese experi-
ence to the company. Another example of the author of the book on Alibaba himself, 
Porter Erisman, a former vice president of Alibaba and one of the Americans working 
for the company in its early years of development (Erisman, 2015).
Alibaba is a Chinese company. Its headquarter is still in Hangzhou, the home town 
of its founder. On the other hand, it is also a global company. When on September 
19, 2014, Alibaba has done the largest IPO in history, it was in New York. Leaders of 
Alibaba are familiar with the realities of the Chinese economy and they adapt to that 
but they think and act like any global company. Even more so, because in fact, they 
can rely less on the state, not more than their Western counterparts. If we want to at-
tract Chinese investment to Europe and Hungary in the future, we need to think value 
for the customer instead of pleasing the Chinese government.
Hungary and China – an evolving strategic partnership
Hungary’s solution to the problem of a divided Europe is accepting reality and aban-
doning “the illusion of federalism” instead of following the utopia of a federalist Eu-
rope, and accepting China’s lead (Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister, 2017; Lui, 
2017). The idea of multipolarity is also present in the implementation of Hungary’s 
eastern opening strategy. Aligned with the Chinese interest of forging closer ties with 
East Central European Member States instead of dealing with a unified European 
Union, Hungary pursues a stronger strategic partnership between China and East 
Central Europe (MTI 2016d; 2016a; Miniszterelnök.hu, 2016).
Hungary’s eastern opening strategy is already generating results. One example is 
the refurbishment of the Budapest–Belgrade railway line to be implemented by a Chi-
nese-Hungarian joint venture (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2016). Another 
example is Chinese telecom giant Huawei which employs more than 2000 people in 
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Hungary already (Ministry for National Economy, 2016) with further talks about an 
increased cooperation including Huawei’s participation in the Digital Welfare Pro-
gramme of the Hungarian Government (MTI, 2016c). Several Chinese enterprises 
also seek cooperation with Hungary in the fields of e-mobility, intelligent transport 
systems, autonomous cars, and smart cities (Ministry for National Economy, 2017) 
The Hungarian Government also signed a partnership agreement with Chinese auto-
motive industry supplier Yanfeng Automotive last year (MTI, 2016b).
This year also started with success in Chinese–Hungarian relations. The Hungar-
ian Government has signed a strategic cooperation agreement with the Bank of Chi-
na, accompanied by other agreements between the Bank of China and the National 
Bank of the Budapest Stock Exchange, the Government Debt Management Agency, 
and Eximbank (MTI, 2017a). As a result of the agreement, the Bank of China will be 
developing closer relations with the Hungarian Investment Promotion Agency and 
Eximbank, and will also be promoting Hungary in China as a European investment 
destination (MTI 2017b).
Conclusions and recommendations
Chinese investments in Europe grew rapidly in the last few years but Chinese out-
bound FDI in Europe still represents a small share in both total Chinese outbound 
FDI and total FDI in Europe. While China’s ambitious One Belt One Road initiative 
shows an intention to further develop economic relations between China and Europe, 
there are also uncertainties ahead.
Chinese investments have been concentrated on the European core with the Unit-
ed Kingdom, Germany, and France as the main targets but the regional scope of Chi-
nese investments in Europe is already expanding. While one of the main motivators of 
China’s European investments is gaining access to technology, successful investments 
require synergy between partners with the Chinese partner also contributing to com-
petitiveness beyond merely providing finance.
There are also concerns about Chinese investments in Europe. The largest Chi-
nese investors are state owned companies and letting them gain access to European 
technology and exerts may even pose a national security risk beyond the economic 
concerns. Another problem is trading fundamental European values and political 
interests for potential economic benefits. The division among Member States of the 
European Union on these issues also poses a risk and China has not been shy to use 
this division to its own advantage.
On the other hand, China is the second largest economy of the world and an 
integral part of the world economy so that developing economic relations between 
Europe and China, and specifically, between Hungary and China benefits both sides. 
With its One Belt One Road initiative, China expressed its intention for a closer co-
operation. It is best to take the OBOR initiative as an opening bid for doing business 
with China on mutually beneficial terms but finding and negotiating for our own 
benefits are not China’s responsibility. The best European, and also Hungarian, strat-
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egy, therefore, is developing our own strategies along our own economic and political 
interest and negotiate lasting deals with China whenever our interests are aligned. It 
is also advisable not to let China divide the EU and not to trade European unity and 
values for short term benefits. China can be a great economic partner but like any 
great power, it has the tendency to expand its sphere of influence and impose it val-
ues, and political system, and interests on others. Holding back China on these fronts 
and doing business on mutually beneficial terms is our responsibility. Without doing 
our own homework, simply following China’s advice will lead to serving its interests 
and giving up our own.
Notes
1  The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect 
the official policy or position of the Central Bank of Hungary or the Doctoral School of Geography.
2  Deutsche Bank reports the transaction as a deal in the consumer sector at a value of 1165 million dollars
3  Deutsche Bank reports China Petroleum & Chemical Corp. as buyer of Talisman Sinopec Energy UK 
Ltd.
4  In a Deutsche Bank report, the acquisition of Volvo Personvagnar AB by Zhejiang Geely Holding Group 
for 1.8 billion dollars is listed but the two transactions are most likely the same as Geely acquired Volvo 
from Ford (Hansakul–Levinger, 2014:14).
5  Despite developing welfare programmes, family is still the primary source of eldercare in China where 
the constitution says that “children who have come of age have the duty to support and assist their par-
ents” (Lou, 2015).
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